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Microeconomics  studies  group  behaviour  by  using  the  representative  member  model. 
However, there is growing evidence that there can be significant differences between choices 
made  by  single  individuals  and  those  made  by  the  same  individuals  when  choosing 
collectively. This study investigates the differences between individual and joint decision-
making in the context of residential location choice. It is widely recognized that household 
location choices involve several members of a household with heterogeneous preferences and 
influence  power.  Nonetheless  little  is  known  about  group  decision-making  processes  in 
practice. In particular, there is only scant evidence on how preferences differ among family 
members  and  to  what  extent  individual  preferences  can  be  aggregated  to  achieve  an 
approximation of joint choices. The study evaluates whether there is heterogeneity in single 
members’  preferences.  Furthermore,  relative  power  is  inferred  by  measuring  similarity 
between ex ante single preferences and ex post joint choice outcomes. We also quantify the 
implicit bias generated by relying on the representative member approach. These issues are 
tested by employing a two-stage conjoint choice experiment administered to a sample of 53 
Italian  families.  This  work  proposes  a  novel  extension  of  the  commonly  used  dyadic 
interaction approach to consider the role of adolescents in household decision-making. 
 
Keywords:  Unitary  household,  stated  choice  experiments,  residential  location,  agent 
interaction and relative influence, discrete choice models, MNL, MMNL. 
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1   Introduction 
Standard microeconomic theory treats the household as the basic decision unit, implicitly 
assuming  either  a  representative  agent  preference  structure  or  a  unitary  household  utility 
function (Chiuri, 1999). Along these lines, empirical studies, employing Stated Preference 
(SP)  techniques  to  study  group  behaviour  have,  with  few  exceptions,  ignored  potentially 
important issues inherent in multi-person choices. The lack of consideration behind the choice 
of  the  “appropriate”  unit  of  analysis
1  may  well  generate  biased  welfare  estimates  and 
erroneous policy predictions (Adamowicz et al., 2005; Molin et al., 1999). Several recent 
studies have questioned the practice of treating group preferences as coincident with those of 
single members. This issue should be tested rather than assumed. There is clear evidence of 
both preference disparity between family members and dissimilarities between choices made 
individually and jointly (Bateman and Munro, 2005a; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009; Dosman and 
Adamowicz, 2006; Hensher et al., 2008; Lampietti, 1999). This paper tests the differences 
between  single  preferences,  considering  three  distinct  household  member-types,  and  their 
joint choices of residential location by formulating three hypotheses:  
First  we  investigate  preference  heterogeneity  among  family  member-types  by  controlling 
whether  the  null  hypothesis  that  all  member-types  have  the  same  preferences  for  each 
attribute can be rejected. 
Second, we test the validity of the representative member hypothesis in two different ways: 1) 
we control whether the joint household decisions can be represented by the average family 
preferences (pooled model) by means of a modified log-likelihood ratio test (Koppelman and 
Bhat, 2006), and, 2) we control whether we can reject the null hypothesis that any of the 
member-types has the same preferences of the family. 
                                          
1 This is testified by the commonly adopted representative member hypothesis where information is gathered from a single 
individual.   3 
For the instances where the representative member hypothesis fails, we estimate the bias 
implied by the “wrong” choice of survey subjects. This bias is quantified in terms of WTP 
and WTA. 
These  hypotheses  are  tested  by  administering  a  two-stage  conjoint  SP  experiment.  This 
methodology  represents  a  novel  extension  of  the,  nowadays  common,  dyadic  interaction 
approach.  In  fact,  in  this  paper  we  also  consider  the  role  adolescents  play  in  household 
residential choice.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the literature on household 
decisions. Section 3 describes the base model of group choices and enunciates the hypotheses 
tested.  Data  and  sample  description  are  reported  in  section  4.  Econometric  results  are 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Research on household decisions 
2.1  Microeconomics of household choices 
Microeconomic analysis of family decisions originates from the consensus household model 
proposed by Samuelson (1956). Indeed, it is recognized that the household, not the individual, 
represents  the  basic  consumption  unit.  A  later  contribution  is  Becker’s  rational  choice 
approach to family-life. Even intimate decisions such as marriage, divorce, and family size 
are supposedly reached through weighing the pros and cons of alternative actions (Becker, 
1993). Becker treats the family much like a tiny specialized factory engaging in household 
production of Z-goods like children, prestige and health (Becker, 1973). Over the last two 
decades, however, there has been a growing recognition that the unitary household model 
does not appropriately reflect the reality of household decision-making. The assumptions of 
the beckerian unitary household model (ranging from the single utility function to the single 
time and budget constraints) have failed numerous empirical tests (Browning and Chiappori, 
1998;  Thomas,  1990).  Game  theoretic  bargaining  models  have  challenged  the  unitary   4 
approach. Here, household behaviour is the outcome of the interaction between heterogeneous 
members with distinct preferences (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). In 
fact, only by treating each member as an independent heterogeneous entity can some form of 
bargaining take place. In essence, classic utility theory is not rejected per se but is regarded as 
inadequate  for  the  analysis  of  household  behaviour  (Browning  and  Chiappori,  1998).  In 
recent years, activity based analysis has produced rich developments of empirically based 
interactive models (Gliebe and Koppelman, 2002; Golob and McNally, 1997). In addition to 
such daily activity behaviour, concerning the coordination of activities among members, one 
can  also  observe  relevant  group-based  decision-making  in  long-term  decisions.  Several 
studies  analyse  group  decisions  regarding  residential  choices  (Molin  et  al.,  1999),  labour 
choices (Chiappori et al., 1998) car ownership (Hensher et al., 2008) and vacation choices 
(Kang and Hsu, 2005). The following sections deal with two essential features of empirical 
household decision-making research, namely, sampling strategies and influence analysis. 
2.2  Sampling strategies for household analysis 
When studying household choices it is standard practice, in SP studies, to ignore differences 
in preferences and power among members. It is possible to classify several strategies and their 
implications for the estimates derived thereby. Generally, empirical research adopts one of the 
following procedures: 
1.  Randomly interview a single member with no further attention to the appropriateness 
of the chosen respondent under the hypothesis that her choice is sufficiently similar to 
that of the family or, she is able to impose her choice on the household. 
2.  Apply  the  same  assumption  as  the  first  procedure,  but  instead  surveying  a  single 
targeted  member  following  a  specific  procedure  to  individuate  the  most  suitable 
respondent (for instance by interviewing the member paying the bills, based on the 
belief that this allows the researcher to identify the actual decision-maker).   5 
3.  Interview a single member that is asked to represent the preferences of the whole 
group. 
4.  Interview (only) the whole household based on the hypothesis that the choice is group-
based and that only collective choices adequately represent real world ones. 
5.  Interview/compare both single and group-based preferences to verify the validity of 
the previous approaches and select the most adequate unit of analysis. 
The first approach, namely an indistinct choice of respondent, assumes that any member-type 
is adequately qualified to represent the preference structure of the family as a whole. This 
method has become standard practice in SP choice modelling of residential location choice. It 
is equivalent to assuming that either differences among members are so small that they can be 
overlooked or they cancel out in the aggregate (Adamowicz et al. 2005). Alternatively, if one 
assumes the household to choose on the basis of a single utility function, then one can simply 
study the preferences of any member to gain an understanding of the household as a whole
2 
(Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Lundberg et al., 1997). Overall there is no explicit selection 
procedure to find the most suitable respondent, neither is there any effort to distinguish single 
and joint responses. 
The  second  approach  is  generally  considered  more  accurate.  It  implies  using  a  proxy  to 
individuate the member considered the most influential or singularly responsible for a certain 
decision (Blood and Wolfe, 1960). One, de facto, assumes that there might be heterogeneity 
and  power  asymmetry  but  that  a  careful  choice  of  the  respondent  can  assure  a  correct 
representation of the household
3. Since there is experimental evidence supporting the view 
that families make influential decisions jointly (Davis and Rigaux, 1974; Munsinger et al., 
1975)  one  can  arguably  question  the  univocal  and  clear  identification  of  the  individual 
                                          
2 Arsenio et al. provide an illustrative example of this approach “Each respondent was an adult who was asked to represent 
the household since this is the unit of decision making in the case of residential choice and the environmental attributes 
would impact on all household member.” (2005, p. 19). 
3 An example of this procedure is reported in Jin et al. (2005, p 5) where the authors say: “The head of the household was 
identified as the person in charge of the daily expenditures and other (younger) family members.”.   6 
responsible for the decision. What is more, traditional indicators, such as relative income, 
may prove distorted proxies of the ability to influence choices (Corfman and Lehmann, 1987; 
Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006). 
Based on these considerations one might adopt the third method for choosing a respondent, 
namely ask the respondent to represent the preferences of other member-types. Empirical 
findings show that, on the contrary, the ability of any one member to correctly assess the 
preferences of others is, in general, rather weak (Corfman and Lehmann, 1987; Dellaert et al., 
1998; Menon et al., 1995). Corfman establishes that there is  a lack of agreement among 
members  when  it  comes  to  determining  influence  over  joint  choices  (1989).  Moreover, 
Dellaert et al. (1998) show how components of a household detain a limited ability to predict 
their own and others influence over joint choices. 
The fourth approach suggests, based on the findings by Molin et al. (1999), to sample the 
whole  group.  This  is  expected  to  provide  estimates  with  higher  predictive  accuracy. 
Applications in the residential literature include Ortùzar and Rodrıguez (2002), Pérez et al. 
(2003) and Galilea and Ortùzar (2005). This approach, however, produces no information 
concerning household components’ likings. This hampers the comparative analysis of power 
differences within the family and does not make explicit disagreements and concessions.  
In line with the fifth approach, this paper investigates the gap between individual and joint 
preferences. Past research indicates that there are large differences between individual and 
joint choice outcomes (Arora and Allenby, 1999; Corfman and Lehmann, 1993; Dellaert et 
al.,  1998).  Recent  contributions  use  an  experimental  approach  to  model  the  differences 
between individual and joint choices (Bateman and Munro, 2009; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009; 
Carlsson  et  al.,  2009;  De  Palma  et  al.,  2008;  Hensher  et  al.,  2007).  On  the  whole  these 
findings indicate that individual choice data are not sufficient to produce representative and 
robust estimates of joint family decisions (Aribarg et al., 2002; Arora and Allenby, 1999;   7 
Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Hensher et al., 2007; Menasco and Curry, 1989; Molin et al., 
1997, 1999; Puckett and Hensher, 2006). There are simply more factors to consider such as 
influence, altruism, roles and resources at play that contribute towards shaping the final joint 
decision. 
2.3  Decision-making in residential household choices 
It is difficult to generalize findings from one context to another given that the level of interest, 
participation and influence among members are all shaped by the specific decision situation. 
Early examples of models considering multi-person residential choices are Timmermans et al. 
(1992) and Borgers and Timmermans (1993). The authors evaluate the influence of transport 
facilities  on  household  residential  choice  in  a  two-stage  experimental  design  that  first 
examines  individual  choice  then  combines  husband  utility  and  wife  utility  based  on  a 
aggregation rule, to express the household utility. The work by Molin et al. (2001; 1997, 
1999; 2000) is the closest to the present study. For example, Molin et al. (2001) capture 
preference  heterogeneity  among  household  members  by  individually  interviewing  each 
member  of  the  147  households  participating  in  the  study;  whereas  Molin  et  al.  (1999) 
compare interactive group responses to conventional conjoint (single agents) to investigate 
the differences between individual and group preferences. The studies show that group-based 
models  are  better  predictors  of  household  residential  location  choices  than  traditional 
approaches. The authors also propose a method to measure the relative influence of each 
member on the household decision outcome.  
SP methods represent a valid option to investigate residential location choices. This study 
belongs to the relatively small group of works employing an experimental SP approach. The 
main contribution is the combination of this experimental approach with two novel features of 
non-market SP evaluation. That is, we focus on the choice of dwelling and apply a group-
based approach. The adoption of an experimental method avoids “yes saying” responses that   8 
ignore actual trade-offs and merely produces declarative responses containing no valuable 
information. Conjoint choice analysis examines the trade-offs people make among attributes 
to assess the weight they assign to each of them
4.  
Residential location choice has often been considered an ideal choice context to elicit agents’ 
preferences for housing attributes. The motivations for this research strategy are due to the: 1) 
more direct perception of the issue at hand since the interview is explicitly connected to the 
present  living  situation;  2)  realistic  simulation  of  the  decision-making  mechanism  agents 
adopt when choosing a dwelling; 3) credible evaluation of attribute variations. 
2.4  From dyads to triads 
Past research on household decision-making has, almost exclusively, focused on dyads alone 
considered as the (only) relevant household decision-making unit (Arora and Allenby, 1999; 
Bateman and Munro, 2005b; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009). For instance in Beharry-Borg et al. 
(2009) the dyadic couple is described as the basic decision-making unit. Understanding the 
role  of  third  party  influences,  such  as  adolescents  or  other  family  members,  on  decision 
strategies is essential, in certain situations, to gain a broader view of the relevant unit of 
analysis.  Decision-making  in  households,  in  fact,  is  influenced  by  the  mere  presence  of 
children. This suggests joint family choices are qualitatively different from atomistic ones 
(Filiatrault and Ritchie, 1980). Spiro (1983) finds that the presence of children influences the 
use  of  persuasive  techniques  in  the  couple.  There  is  also  empirical  evidence  against  the 
unitary household model in location choice among childless dyadic households (Mok, 2007). 
However, the author notes that in the presence of children there is not sufficient evidence to 
reject the parent income-pooling hypothesis. 
                                          
4 Examples of experimental choice studies on accessibility and environmental factors are profile based studies like Molin et 
al. (1999), ranking exercises such as Galilea and Ortùzar, (2005), Perez et al. (2003), Ortùzar and Rodrıguez (2002) Arsenio 
et al (2006), or a comparison between methods like Wardman and Bristow (2008).   9 
2.5  Relative power analysis 
Research suggests that a large proportion of the relevant decisions made by families are joint 
efforts by two or more family members (Davis and Rigaux, 1974; Samuelson, 1956). Various 
researchers from different fields have analyzed decision-making in households composed of 
individuals with non-identical preferences. Especially, research in marketing has modelled 
influence strategies in family decision-making (Davis, 1970; Shuptrine and Samuelson 1976). 
A common approach to measure the influence exerted by a member is to compare her initial 
preferences to the group’s decision outcome. The degree of similarity between the first and 
the latter is taken as an indicator of the extent of influence (Corfman, 1989; Corfman and 
Lehmann, 1987). Recent empirical research conducted by Aribarg et al. (2002), Arora and 
Allenby (1999), and Arora (2006) present useful modelling approaches to measure individual 
influence at the attribute level in the context of group decision-making. This development is 
essential given the growing importance of techniques based on choices between goods and 
services with bundled characteristics. 
The issue of obtaining accurate information concerning relative influence in family decision-
making is still hotly debated and remains, mostly, unresolved. In the related literature, an 
array of methods has been suggested to evaluate the role of interaction. These are almost 
exclusively based on a questionnaire SP logic. In fact, data obtained from observed behaviour 
does not allow the detection of interaction effects. Research efforts such as Kirchelers’ Diary 
method (Kirchler, 1995) and Arora and Allenby’s attribute-specific influence measure (1999) 
are simply based on self-declared power measures. However, the literature has questioned this 
method  of  measuring  power
5.  Moreover  past  research  reveals  a  limited  ability  of  single 
members to assess other member’s preferences (Corfman and Lehmann, 1987; Dellaert et al. 
1998; Menon et al. 1995). Analysing the role of children in influencing decisions is especially 
                                          
5 Corfman states that: “Predictions and reports on relative influence made by spouses and observers are probably not valid 
indicators of relative influence. They may contain other useful information, but they are not objective measures.” (Corfman, 
1989, p 663).   10 
complex. The papers considering it, generally based on declared influence, show that the 
children are aware of their influencing power while the parents, in general, underestimate it 
(Flurry and Burns, 2005). One needs to devise a method to uncover the unobservable so to 
obtain adequate SP data on household interaction. Authors such as Katz (1997) and Manski 
(2000)  suggest  that  an  experimental  approach  is  needed  to  identify  the  heterogeneity  of 
preferences and disentangle the intricacy of household decision-making
6. Experiments have 
the advantage of allowing the researcher to produce data suitable to perform controlled tests 
of a theory.  
3  Model and hypotheses 
3.1  Base model of group choices 
The various alternatives are described by a utility function of a general form. The model is 
kept simple to allow a meaningful comparison between individual and joint preferences. The 
impact  of  socio-economic  interactions  is  not  treated  in  the  present  work  due  to  the 
considerable difficulties in computing them along with interaction effects and not because we 
regard their potential effects as marginal. On the contrary, a follow-up paper under way will 
explicitly address this specific issue. The general utility function used is the following:  
Ujk = !1jnSQ + !2jRENT + !3jACC + !4 jAIR + !5jNOISE + "     (1) 
Ujk is the overall utility of the jth participant for k attributes in the experiment proposed to the 
four member-types (mother [M], father [D], adolescent [A] and joint-family-decision [F]). 
β1jn is the coefficient of the constant capturing the intrinsic preference of the jth respondent 
for  alternative  n  and  !2j -!5j   are  coefficients.  The  disturbances,  ! ,  are  independent  and 
identically distributed (IID) extreme value type I (Gumbel). 
                                          
6 In the words of Manski, “Empirical analysis of social interactions would particularly benefit from performance of well-
designed experiments in controlled environments and from careful solicitation of persons' subjective perceptions of the 
interactions in which they participate.” (2000, p 117).   11 
The variables to be estimated are the SQ (codified as a dummy = 1 when the current housing 
is chosen), RENT (measured in euro), ACC (measuring the access time in minutes), AIR 
(identifying the level of air pollution) and NOISE (level of noise). 
While MNL is the most commonly used choice model, nonetheless it exhibits well-known 
restrictions that limit realism, particularly in cases where individuals have diverse preferences 
and behavioural attitudes (Hensher et al., 2005; Train, 2003). This fact may not be overlooked 
given the aim of assessing the preferences of different household members. In a MNL setting 
all member-types are assumed to exhibit a zero degree of random preference heterogeneity. In 
other words, the vector of βs merely reflects a sample mean. What is more, MNL assumes 
that  individuals’  unobserved  utility  is  uncorrelated  across  alternatives  and  over  repeated 
choices. In brief the factors explaining the unobserved utility are assumed to be perfectly 
random. 
Mixed  multinomial  logit  (MMNL)  represents  a  major  breakthrough  in  discrete  choice 
(Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 1998). As implied by the name, MMNL is effectively a 
mixture of logits. The point of departure is a basic MNL that is brought to accommodate 
heterogeneity  by  iteratively  taking  draws  of  the  estimated  coefficients  from  a  predefined 
underlying (mixing) distribution (e.g. normal, lognormal, triangular, etc.). This procedure is 
repeated numerous times and the outcomes averaged to produce the desired results. 
3.2  Hypotheses testing: individuals and triads 
At this stage we can consider response heterogeneity more rigorously. Binary comparisons of 
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1c: the coefficients regarding single attributes are not pair-wise statistically different 














          (2) 
We  test  the  second  hypothesis,  concerning  the  validity  of  the  representative  member 
approach, in two different specifications. 
In the first test specification, we control if the average family preferences (pooled model) can 
correctly represent joint household decisions. This is carried out via a modified log-likelihood 
ratio test that controls if the preferences of the pooled sample are an adequate representation 
of the single member sub-samples. 
H0
2: More formally we test the  H0
2 hypothesis by using a market segment test that compares 
the log-likelihood of the pooled model against the sum of individual log-likelihood models. 
The test statistic is then confronted with the critical χ
2 value corrected for the degrees of 
freedom  (Koppelman  &  Bhat  2006).  We  want  to  reject  the  null  of  preference  equality 






D          (3) 
In the second instance, we check if single agent-type responses can aptly represent the joint 




3c: we check whose single member-type preferences are the most representative 
of the joint family. This test will help individuating the most suitable respondent to interview 
for the aim of the study. 
                                          
7 It would have been possible to test the more restrictive hypothesis of  !k
D = !k
M = !k
A , however that approach provides less 
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Based on these tests we will also estimate the bias implied by each hypotheses. 
4  Data and sample description 
4.1  Development of the stated choice experiment 
4.1.1  Description of survey instrument 
A  SP  experiment  was  administered  to  measure  individual  and  household  preferences  for 
residential location. It was based on a pivoted design that presented two alternative housing 
bundles and the status quo situation. The hypothetical housing alternatives are related to the 
respondent-specific status quo and, more precisely, levels are expressed both in percentage 
around the revealed preference values as well as in discrete variations for the environmental 
attributes. The experiment was unlabeled. The reference status quo alternative is based on the 
levels stated by the respondents (see Appendix). This procedure was adopted since the arrival 
point for different respondents was not necessarily the same
8. The status quo is inserted also 
to increase the degree of realism and to avoid artificially boosting the part worth utilities of 
the remaining attributes. 
4.1.2  Attributes and levels 
The levels of the attributes for the experiment are drawn from recent literature on residential 
choice. We include four attributes that are considered to be among the most influential in 
choosing a housing situation. The final selection consists of rent, air pollution, noise and 
accessibility to work/school. Table 1 illustrates these attributes and the levels used to describe 
them. 
 
                                          
8 This situation of course generates different travel times among members.   14 
 
Table 1. Attributes and levels 
Rent     Air pollution    
1  20 % lower than current  1  Very low level of emissions 
2  10 % lower than current  2  Acceptable level of emissions 
3  Same as current  3  Quite high emissions 
4  10 % higher than current  4  Very high emissions 
5  20 % higher than current       
Accessibility     Noise    
1  50 % less time to reach work/school  1  Quiet house 
2  Same distance as currently  2  Low level of noise 
3  50 % more time to reach work/school  3  Quite noisy 
      4  Very noisy 
A full profile, fractional factorial design was used to combine the attributes and levels. In the 
case of three alternatives, each having four attributes with three to five attribute levels each, 
where the number of combinations is 5×3×4
2=240. Since it is impossible to show the full 
design to a single respondent the design was subdivided in 15 blocks where each choice set 
consisted of 16 choice tasks. Given the sample of 53 respondents of each member-type, the 
design was “covered” more than three times for each member-type. 
4.2  Sequential survey administration 
A  two-step  methodology  was  used  to  complete  interviews  with  three-component  families 
consisting of fathers, mothers, adolescents as well as the family (all members responding 
together). The choice tasks combined four attributes characterizing the residential localization 
denoted by a short definition. The conjoint design guarantees that choices take place between 
different  profiles  rather  than  single  attributes  thus  avoiding  abstract  rating  or  ranking 
exercises. A summary of the explanatory variables is given in the Appendix. 
The study involved the following three steps: 
Step  1 ( pre-interview  /  individual  task):  The  interviewees  answered  questions  on 
individual and family socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes and present housing   15 
conditions.  Each  member  conducted  the  interview  without  the  presence  of  other 
members to avoid external influence. 
Step 2 (interview / individual task): The first round of choice tasks was individual. The 
aim of this step was to elicit each member’s preferences. Respondents were instructed 
to choose on the basis of their own preferences only. More in detail, they were told, 
“In this part of the study we are interested in your opinion. We would like you to 
choose the housing alternative that you prefer the most.” 
Step 3 (interview / group task): The second round brought the members together and 
discussion was encouraged in order to reach a joint decision. The families, in this step, 
were instructed to jointly select an alternative. More specifically, they were told, “We 
would like you to choose the housing alternative that you all can agree on among the 
following.” 
Five  adequately  instructed  university  students  interviewed  53  households.  The  interviews 
were face-to-face computer assisted (CAPI) and carried out in the home of the respondents. 
The students were trained in interview administration and instructed to find families living 
together and including, at least, one adolescent
9. 
4.3  Description of sample 
The sample consisted of 53 Italian households, implying that 212 interviews were carried out 
in total (4 member-types). The majority was located in the city of Rome and in the Friuli-
Venezia-Giulia  region.  Most  families  included  three  (53%  of  the  sample)  or  four  (37%) 
members: mother, father and son/daughter. In families with more than 3 members, only 1 
adolescent  was  interviewed.  We  consider  this  sampling  approach,  implicitly  adopting  a 
“representative child” hypothesis, a reasonable trade-off between accuracy and complexity 
(Kato and Matsumoto 2009). Further descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix. 
                                          
9  Such a sampling procedure is not ideal from  a statistical standpoint but proved a necessity due to the nature of the 
interviews and is in line with the procedure employed by Hensher et al. (2008).   16 
5  Econometric results 
5.1  MNL specification 
A MNL was estimated as a reference model. Results are reported in Table 2. All estimations 
were performed using Nlogit 4.0 (Greene, 2007). In the first column of the table the variables 
are listed. A separate model for each member-type and for the joint household choice was 
estimated. For each model we report the value of the coefficients and t-statistics. Coefficients 
(βSQ, βACC, βRENT, βAIR, βNOISE) are all statistically significant and have the expected signs. The 
MNL is estimated using the absolute values for time and rent (Table 2). The stated levels of 
air pollution and noise are used to pivot the environmental coefficients. 
Table 2. MNL model results 
  Joint    Individual preferences          
  Family    Son    Mother    Father    
  Beta  t-ratio  Beta  t-ratio  Beta  t-ratio  Beta  t-ratio 
Sq  1,096  8,94  1,153  9,65  0,818  7,15  0,893  8,09 
Rent  -0,009  -9,44  -0,008  -8,96  -0,009  -9,62  -0,006  -7,77 
Acc  -0,104  -9,21  -0,107  -9,68  -0,066  -6,42  -0,056  -6,82 
Air  -0,839  -9,03  -0,573  -7,29  -0,886  -9,8  -0,852  -9,73 
Noise  -0,535  -5,29  -0,513  -5,59  -0,534  -5,65  -0,396  -4,49 
Summary statistics            
Obs  646   646   646   646  
LL*  -350,3   -386,1   -362,7   -389,3  
LL(c)  -573,7   -575,4   -593,1   -574,2  
Rho
2  0,389   0,329   0,388   0,322  
Rho
2 adj  0,387    0,326    0,386    0,319   
 
The SQ variable is coded 1 for the current housing and 0 otherwise. As such it expresses the 
desire to remain in the current housing situation along with the general influence of omitted 
variables (Train 2003). The results reported in Table 2 for each agent-type are not comparable 
due  potential  differences  in  scale.  Comparability  is  achieved  by  scale  correction,  when 
appropriate, using the nested logit “trick” (Hensher and Bradley, 1993).   17 
Table 3. Nested logit model results 
  Family    Adolescent    Mother    Father   
Variable  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-stat 
SQ  0,717  7,2  0,542  8,2  0,457  5,1  0,407  6 
Rent  -0,007  -9,6  -0,004  -8,9  -0,007  -9,9  -0,004  -7,6 
Acc  -0,069  -8,3  -0,051  -9,2  -0,039  -5,3  -0,028  -5,9 
Air  -0,947  -12,1  -0,459  -10,3  -0,958  -13,1  -0,722  -13,1 
Noise  -0,242  -3,1  -0,187  -3,9  -0,225  -3,3  -0,152  -2,9 
Scale  1  fixed  0,676  18,5  0,925  18,7  0,724  18,8 
Summary statistics                 
LL*  -2314,894               
LL(c)  -3726,493               
McFadden 
Rsq  .725               
Table 3 indicates the adolescent has the most interest in status quo and accessibility. In line 
with results obtained by Molin et al. (2001), we believe that a plausible explanation of the 
high preference of the adolescent for the status quo might be that he/she has strong links with 
friends living in the immediate surroundings. Likewise the importance of accessibility is high 
for the adolescent. On the other hand the concern for the environmental aspects (noise and 
pollution)  was,  along  with  rent,  most  pronounced  for  mothers,  whereas  fathers  are 
characterised by relatively low values of the βs for all attributes
10. These observations may be 
associated with the set of  H
1
0  hypotheses concerning the binary comparison of member type 
preferences.  What  is  more  they  offer  a  first  proof  of  the  H
3a
0   to  H
3c
0 comparing  single 
members to the family, or joint, outcome. It may be noted that, although the mother has a 
similar scale factor to the family, not all coefficients are of the same entity. 
5.2  MMNL and individual specific MMNL specification 
Several studies have applied mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) to measure variation from 
unobserved sources. The MMNL specification was used allowing status quo, accessibility and 
air pollution to vary randomly across respondents and assumed to be normally distributed 
                                          
10 The scale factor for fathers is as low as that of the adolescent. This implies that the standard deviation of the observation is 
relatively high and there is a high degree of noise in the data. The mother is more akin to the response of the family with a 
high scale factor.   18 
(Train, 1998). To avoid artificially suppressing heterogeneity no constraints were imposed on 
the  distributions.  The  standard  deviation  of  the  noise  parameter  was  not  statistically 
significant in any of the models estimated. For WTP/WTA identification purposes the βRENT 
was  kept  fixed.  The results  reported  in Table  4  indicate  that  the  introduction  of  housing 
attributes  with  random  parameters  improves  the  statistical  fit  compared  to  the  MNL 
specification. 
Table 4. Random parameters models 
  Family    Adolescent    Mother    Father   
Variable  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
Rent (non r)  -0,014  -8,5  -0,009  -8,1  -0,014  -8,8  -0,009  -7,3 
Noise(non r)  -0,983  -6,0  -0,771  -6,2  -1,155  -6,9  -0,745  -5,4 
SQ (r.n)  1,427  5,0  1,150  5,4  1,179  3,8  1,140  4,4 
SQ (st dev)  1,610  5,9  1,096  4,4  1,940  6,3  1,554  5,8 
Acc (r.n)  -0,163  -6,6  -0,151  -6,2  -0,122  -5,0  -0,111  -5,7 
Acc(st dev)  0,051  1,9  0,065  3,0  0,070  2,7  0,056  3,1 
Air (r.n)  -1,957  -7,7  -1,131  -6,4  -1,693  -8,4  -1,674  -8,1 
Air (st dev)  0,777  4,3  0,698  4,3  0,449  1,8  0,668  4,2 
Summary statistics               
LL*  -287,505    -348,225    -300,531    -325,775   
LL (const.)  -698,717    -698,717    -698,717    -698,717   
Rsq  .467    .367    .468    .414   
RsqAdj  .463    .363    .464    .410   
All parameters in the model have the expected signs and are statistically significant. The 
standard deviation for each of the mixed coefficients was statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This indicates the presence of heterogeneity among all member-types regarding travel 
time, air pollution and the status quo. The results indicate that there is no underlying unitary 
preference structure in our sample in line with the rejection of H
1a
0  to H
1c
0 . 
5.3  WTP/WTA estimates 
The calculations of the WTP/WTA measures for the attributes show that there is no specific 
influence deriving from the model adopted. In fact the results of the MNL specification are   19 
generally in line with those derived from the MMNL specification with the only exception 
being  accessibility.  Daily  WTP/WTA  measures  are  reported  for  facilitating  interpretation 
since monthly rent is used as the numeraire (Table 5). 
Table 5. WTP/WTA results 
   MNL           RPL          
   Family  Adol.  Mother  Father  Family  Adol.  Mother  Father 
SQ (€/level)  -4,07  -4,86  -3,11  -4,61  -3,33  -4,08  -2,79  -4,17 
Accessibility (€/hour)  23,08  27,11  14,94  17,33  22,74  32,15  17,23  24,37 
Air pollution (€/level)  3,12  2,42  3,37  4,40  4,56  4,01  4,00  6,13 
Noise (€/level)  1,99  2,16  2,03  2,04  2,29  2,73  2,73  2,73 
Notes: the WTA estimate is referred to the SQ while the remaining attributes are described as WTP, All values are 
referred to a daily WTP/WTA. 
In  the  MNL  specification,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  mothers  had  the  highest 
environmental coefficients, the fathers show a higher WTP for both noise and air pollution. 
Adolescents are characterised by a strikingly high WTP for accessibility and a relatively high 
WTA for the status quo. 
In the MMNL specification, similar results are obtained. WTP for accessibility coefficients 
are, on average, greater than in the MNL specification. The other noteworthy aspects are 
fathers’ increased interest in air pollution, noise and status quo. The apparent loss of intensity 
in mothers’ preferences is due to the pronounced interest this group has for rent, used as 
denominator in the WTP/WTA measures. Despite this, mothers appear to be the best predictor 
of the joint choice outcome. 
5.3.1  Member and individual specific differences in WTP/WTA 
In this paragraph we report the results for individual specific WTP/WTA estimates which are 
useful to compare the distribution of the various coefficients around the mean and show their 
relative  dispersion.  At  the  individual  level  the  status  quo  attribute  is,  in  general,  not 
statistically different from zero and in line with the general ex ante expectation that not all the 
interviewees have a strong and common view of the status quo situation. As noticed earlier   20 
adolescents have the highest WTP for accessibility as the kernel density confirms (see Figure 
1). Fathers, in this case represent the joint family choice better, although mothers are also 
proximate.  In  other  words  the  family  outcome  is  de  facto  an  average  of  the  fathers  and 
mothers WTP. All the coefficients are statistically significant and different from zero with the 
exception of the mothers; they are positive, as one would expect, notwithstanding the fact that 
no restrictions on the βs signs were imposed. Regarding WTP for decreasing the level of air 
pollution one notices that mothers have an extremely homogeneous evaluation of air pollution 
albeit  with  a  lower  mean  value  with  respect  to  other  member-types  as  controlled  for  in 
H0
1a and  H0
1b. Adolescents’ evaluations of air pollution are in line with those of the family 
while fathers have both the highest average values and the most spread out distribution. The 
WTP  data  show  adolescents  to  be  the  least  reliable  proxy  for  understanding  family 
preferences  (several  β’s  are  non  significant  and  some  are  even  negative)  implying  the 
falsification of H0
3a. Notwithstanding this, their final values are the most similar to that of the 
family. This is probably the average of fathers’ and mothers’ preferences.   21 
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Heterogeneity  in  the  sample  indicate  considerable  preference  differences  both  among 
member-types as well as within them. Thus, we implicitly consider the set of  H
1a
0  to  H0
1c 
hypotheses rejected. In more detail, in the case of air pollution, mothers could well be treated 
by adopting a “representative mother” hypothesis. On the contrary, adolescents and fathers 
are both distinctly different from mothers for this attribute and there is evidence of substantial 
disagreement within these groups in line with the rejection of H
1a
0  and H
1b
0 . 
5.4  Similarity and relative power 
Similarity  is  a  proxy  for  relative  power.  Similarity  between  a  member-type  ex-ante 
preferences and the joint ex-post ones indicates that this member-type has a higher relative 
power over the joint decision. In fact, this signals that the other household members accepted 
a  larger  deviation  from  her  preferred  choice  outcomes.  This  logic  is  commonly  used  in 
studying dyadic decisions where there is no ambiguity as to who prevails. However, with 
more than two participants, identification of the source of relative power is more complex. In 
fact, an intermediate position between two extremes could be explained in two different ways. 
It may indicate power equality or, on the contrary, it may be due to the dominance of a 
member that happens to lie in the middle of the extreme preferences. 
Table 6. Standard deviation between family and single members (MMNL normal dist.)  
  WTP sq  WTP acc  WTP air 
Adolescent  0,387  -1,431  0,358 
Mother  -0,260  0,826  0,324 
Father  0,431  -0,231  -1,132 
Table notes: The absolute values reported are the delta between the family and each member-
type  WTP/WTA  βs  in  terms  of  standard  deviations  of  individual  estimates.  The  sign 
represents  the distance (positive or negative)  that the family has compared to  each  single 
member. 
The data reported can be used as a formal description of the proximity of each member-type 
to the joint choice outcomes. For example, fathers are more willing to pay for accessibility 
(24,37 €) than the family as a whole (22,37 €) but they are also the best single member-type   23 
predictors for this attribute. In fact, the WTP standard deviation of fathers from the family is 
the smallest (-0,23 above) compared to mothers (0,82 below) and adolescents who are 1,43 
standard deviations above the family (see Table 6). Considering air pollution one can observe 
that  fathers  are  furthest  away  from  family  preferences  (1,13  stnd.  dev.  above).  Instead, 
mothers and adolescents have similar positions (0,32 and 0,36 stnd. dev.) but below family 
estimates.  
In general relative power analysis can be complicated in the case of three-member families. 
This is due to the intricate identification of the source of power. In fact, to determine the 
relative power of each member-type we cannot solely rely on similarity but also need to 
account for ex-ante preference intensity. An emblematic example of this point, in our sample, 
is adolescents’ influence over air pollution. Despite the fact that adolescents show a limited 
interest for this attribute according to the previous measure of similarity adopted, one could 
mistakenly interpret this as a result of relative power. However, we are convinced that the 
final result is most probably due to reconciliation between fathers’ and mothers’ distinctly 
different preferences averaging out over adolescents’ intermediate position. The amount of 
noise  inherent  in  each  member-type’s  preference,  as  opposed  to  the  occurrence  of 
adventitious similarity, may also be studied in the reported box-plots (Figure 2).   24 
 






Notes: sq is referred to the status quo value, acc indicates accessibility and air 
stands for air pollution. The unit of measurement is the monthly WTP/WTA   25 
 
In the box-plot diagrams it is possible to discover member specific data spread, as well as 
similarity  in  the  median.  For  instance  the  mothers’  WTP  for  access  and  air  pollution 
abatement are both quite concentrated around the mean and, at the same time, similar to those 
of the family. This finding offers ulterior evidence towards the H
3b
0 hypothesis. 
5.5  Quantifying the bias of the “representative member” hypotheses 
In this paragraph we illustrate the potential bias induced by an uncritical adoption of the 
representative member hypothesis. These considerations might be extremely important for 
policy evaluations. We compare the family WTP/WTA values, derived from the MMNL, with 
those of each member-type as well as with the pooled sample. 
Figure 3. Illustration of WTP/WTA bias based on MMNL WTP 
 
The use of a randomly selected sample of family member-types would provoke an up-ward 
bias for accessibility (1,27 €). For the other attributes there is no relevant distortion. On the 
other hand the comparison between single member-types and the family data reported give us 
an idea of the entity of the over- or under-estimation bias introduced were we to use the 
targeted  sample  strategy.  For  instance  in  the  case  of  studying  accessibility  by  targeting   26 
mothers we would underestimate the WTP for accessibility by 5,50 € per hour. By targeting 
adolescents for accessibility one would over-estimate by 9,41 € per hour. Based on our results 
only noise could be aptly studied by targeting any member-type. 
6  Summary and conclusions 
The representative member hypothesis has, since long, been the cornerstone of household 
analysis. Its validity has only recently been questioned. In fact, analysts have generally treated 
the household as if it were an individual, a single economic unit without much interest as to 
what went on within it. Theory building and policy definition assumed households to have a 
single  set  of  preferences.  Were  this  true,  inquiring  the  preferences  of  a  single  individual 
would  be  sufficient  to  model  family  ones.  This  approach  is  acceptable  if  either  the 
representative member adequately describes other members’ preferences or if she holds the 
power over a certain decision. Research findings, in the last decades, cast doubts over these 
assumptions. What is more, families make influential decisions jointly. This makes it difficult 
to locate an individual that is solely responsible for the decision (Davis and Rigaux, 1974). 
Traditional indicators, such as relative income, may prove poor proxies for ability to influence 
choices.  Past  empirical  research  point  to  large  differences  between  individual  and  joint 
choices (Arora and Allenby 1999, Beharry-Borg et al. 2009; Corfman and Lehmann 1993; 
Dellaert et al. 1998; Molin et al. 1999;). When families decide jointly in the presence of 
heterogeneity we need to consider novel methods to detect preference disparity. Lastly, if 
single members were able to describe the preferences of the family, then we might still be 
able to salvage the traditional representative member approach. However, studies find a weak 
ability  to  assess  other  members’  preferences  (Corfman  and Lehmann  1987;  Menon  et  al. 
1995) and a limited capacity to predict own influence over joint choice (Dellaert et al. 1998). 
So, what is done in this paper to analyze interactive family decision-making keeping these 
critical comments in mind?    27 
The paper tests three hypotheses. We first reject the hypothesis that there is no significant 
preference heterogeneity at the attribute level both among and within different member-types. 
Subsequently,  we  test  the  representative  member  hypothesis  to  assess  whether  the  utility 
functions of single respondents differ from the pooled or post-discussion group utility. SP 
studies typically interview single members to gather “representative” information regarding 
collective  preferences.  The  shortcomings  of  the  representative  member  assumption  are 
revealed in two specifications. Firstly we test the null that the pooled choices correctly reveal 
the  preference  structure  expressed  in  the  joint  choice  ( H
2
0 ).  Secondly  we  analyse  the 
coefficients  of  member-types  and  compare  them  to  family  responses.  This  allows  us  to 







0 ). For  H
2
0
 a log-likelihood ratio test shows that the pooled version of the 
sample  is  not  a  statistically  valid  representation  of  individual  answers
11.  For  H
3a
0 to  H
3c
0  
looking at the box-plot reported in Figure 2 one can appreciate the difference in WTP/WTA 
distribution among member-types. 
Finally,  we  quantify  the  WTP/WTA  bias  inherent  in  the  uncritical  adoption  of  the 
representative  member  hypothesis.  This  is  illustrated  for  both  the  specific  and  average 
member-type hypotheses. 
It is important to associate these findings with the sampling strategies used in household 
research.  By  analyzing  the  coefficients  of  the  members  and  comparing  them  to  family 
responses one can understand to what extent family members agree on the relevance of the 
different  attributes  in  line  with  the  second  sampling  approach  (see  par.  2.2)  tested  in 
hypothesis  H
3a
0  to  H
3c
0 . That is, if a specific single member adequately represents family 
                                          
11 Indeed the test of the equality between the pooled model against the sum of individual models yields a test statistic of 
36,16 to be compared against the critical χ
2 value (at 95%) of 25. 
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preferences, as in  H
3c
0  then the representative member assumption cannot be rejected and 
interviewing  only  that  specific  member  would  cause  no  distortion.  This  implies  that 
interviewing  both  single  member-types  as  well  as  the  family,  as  described  in  the  fifth 
sampling approach would not be resource-efficient. 
Alternatively,  one  may  test  the  null  that  it  is  the  pooled  choices  to  reveal  the  correct 
preference structure in line with sampling approach n°1. This implies that randomly selecting 




In view of the results from our sample, concerning the rejection of the hypothesis of the 
representative  member,  we  conclude  that  a  further  investigation  of  the  fifth  sampling 
approach is justified. 
Finally  we  discuss  the  implications  of  modelling  three-member  households.  In  this  paper 
similarity  in  preferences  between  the  family  and  single  members  is  used  as  a  proxy  for 
influence. However the issues of identification of influence is made complex by accidental 
similarity in part-worths, in particular for the case of the adolescent. Although at first gaze 
this might be interpreted as relative power we need to carefully consider the position of all 
members that contribute towards the family choice. It is, indeed not possible to exclude the 
prospect that the final result is due to reconciliation between fathers’ and mothers’ distinctly 
different preferences averaging out near the adolescents’ intermediate position. 
Future research will: explore more cost efficient and empirically robust sampling strategies; 
test different mixing distributions and truncations for random parameters; develop advanced 
methodologies  to  study  relative  power  in  a  triadic  context;  research  and  identify  agent-
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Appendix 
      Family  Adolescent  Mother  Father 
  Variable  Unit  Average  StDev  Average  StDev  Average  StDev  Average  StDev 
Age  Average  -  -  22,47  6,45  49,96  9,28  54,06  6,68 
































Rent  Euro  696,99  366,18  694,79  365,80  700,45  365,84  695,74  367,85 
Current access time  Minutes  -  -  20,34  15,33  19,21  16,30  23,25  19,18 
Acceptability current access  Level 1-3  -  -  1,28  0,53  1,23  0,54  1,23  0,47 
Current pollution level  Level 1-5  -  -  1,74  1,08  1,68  1,07  1,68  1,01 
Acceptability of current pollution  Level 1-3  -  -  1,28  0,63  1,32  0,67  1,34  0,65 

















Acceptability of current noise  Level 1-3  -  -  1,15  0,41  1,19  0,52  1,17  0,43 
Travel Mode: by foot  %      15%    23%    21%   


































Pro political intervention  % yes  -  -  38%    43%    34%   
Secondary School  %  -  -  28%    17%    23%   











University  %  -  -  32%    32%    32%   
Employee  %  -  -  38%    70%    62%   












Freelancer  %  -  -  0%    15%    32%   
Importance Noise  Level 1-5  4,40  0,79  4,11  1,15  4,42  0,84  4,34  0,96 























Importance of Access to work  Level 1-5  4,17  0,78  4,23  0,89  3,89  1,10  3,64  0,90 